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Abstract: We estimate a model of foreclosure using a data set that includes every residential mortgage, 
purchase-and-sale, and foreclosure transaction in Massachusetts from 1989 to 2008. We address the 
identification issues related to the estimation of the effects of house prices on residential foreclosures. We 
then use the model to study the dramatic increase in foreclosures that occurred in Massachusetts between 
2005 and 2008 and conclude that the foreclosure crisis was primarily driven by the severe decline in 
housing prices that began in the latter part of 2005, not by a relaxation of underwriting standards on 
which much of the prevailing literature has focused. We argue that relaxed underwriting standards did 
severely aggravate the crisis by creating a class of homeowners who were particularly vulnerable to the 
decline in prices. But, as we show in our counterfactual analysis, that emergence alone, in the absence of 
a price collapse, would not have resulted in the substantial foreclosure boom that was experienced. 
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 1. Introduction
There are two competing theories to explain the explosion of foreclosures in the United States in 2007–
2009. The ﬁrst focuses almost entirely on underwriting standards, and attributes the crisis to loans that
borrowers had trouble repaying, either because they had bad credit and little income to begin with, or
because the loans were unrealistically generous at the time of origination and later became unaﬀordable.
There is persuasive prima facie evidence that is consistent with this theory. For example, subprime loans,
which expanded credit by oﬀering loans to borrowers who previously could not obtain any mortgage credit,
and by oﬀering large loans to those who previously could only obtain small loans, account for a dispropor-
tionate number of foreclosures. Subprime lending emerged as a major force in mortgage markets shortly
before foreclosures began to accelerate, and were concentrated in communities that later became foreclosure
hotspots. An alternative explanation focuses on house prices and points to the precipitous decline in prices
that started in 2005 or 2006, depending on where in the country one looks, as an explanation for the crisis.
There is prima facie evidence that is consistent with this theory as well. For example, until house prices be-
gan falling, subprime mortgages performed very well. In addition, states where house prices began declining
sooner experienced foreclosure waves sooner than in states where prices began falling later.
In this paper, we assess the merits of the “poor underwriting” and “falling house price” theories. We
argue that, in a sense, both explanations are true, but that prices have primacy. We ﬁnd that had prices not
fallen, we would simply not have had a major foreclosure crisis, regardless of whether lenders had lowered
underwriting standards in 2003 and 2004. By contrast, the observed fall in prices would have generated a
substantial increase in foreclosures, even if lenders had retained the underwriting standards that prevailed
in 2002. To be sure, the increase in foreclosures would have been substantially smaller without subprime
lending because as we show that subprime loans are far more sensitive to a decline in house prices than
prime loans, but the foreclosure rate would still have been very large relative to historical levels, and would
have been still considered a major public policy problem.
The central issue that any researcher must address in such an analysis is how to identify the eﬀect of
house prices on foreclosures. One natural explanation for the observed relationship is that the increase
in foreclosures caused prices to fall. If that were the case, then the observed relationship between prices
and foreclosures becomes evidence for the bad underwriting theory not the falling prices theory. The ﬁrst
contribution of this paper is to use a novel identiﬁcation strategy to test this explanation of the crisis. We
exploit within-town, within-time variation in household-level measures of housing equity to refute the theory
that price falls resulted from diﬀerences in foreclosures over time and across communities. If foreclosures
caused the fall in prices, we would expect to see little eﬀect of prices on foreclosures within communities and
within time periods, and large diﬀerences in the eﬀect of prices on foreclosures across communities and over
time due to simultaneity bias. In fact, we ﬁnd that the observed relationship between prices and foreclosures
is virtually identical whether we use variation across communities, within communities, within a given time
period, or over time.
We use a dataset based on deed records in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from 1989 through
2008, which has been previously used to study housing issues, most notably, in an inﬂuential paper on
forced sales and foreclosures by Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2009). The dataset was constructed by the
Warren Group, and has both advantages and disadvantages over other datasets used to study foreclosure and
mortgage performance. The main disadvantage is that we do not observe detailed borrower characteristics
such as credit score, or loan characteristics such as whether the interest rate is adjustable or ﬁxed. However,
we do observe the identity of the lender and we use this information to match the data with the HUD list of
subprime lenders in order to identify loans as subprime or prime. Using a subset of loans for which the data
provider recorded more detailed loan information, we show that these loans conform to generally accepted
1deﬁnitions of subprime loans. In addition, the sharp contrast between the performance of loans we identify
as prime and those that we identify as subprime largely validates the HUD measure as a reasonable proxy
for underwriting standards. The other signiﬁcant disadvantage is that the dataset contains information for
the state of Massachusetts only. However, we show that the Massachusetts experience in the current crisis is
quite typical of the country as a whole and not dissimilar to that of more prominent foreclosure and subprime
lending hot-spots like California.
Using the Warren Data confers many advantages over other commonly used datasets in the empirical
housing literature. The ﬁrst is that it contains the universe of all residential property and mortgage trans-
actions in Massachusetts, and thus covers all types of loans. In contrast, the often-used First American,
LoanPerformance (LP) dataset, a natural alternative, is almost entirely composed of subprime and reduced-
documentation Alt-A loans, and contains only mortgages securitized by private institutions. More than half
of the foreclosures in Massachusetts in 2007 and 2008 involved prime loans, and approximately two-thirds in-
volved homes that were purchased with prime mortgages. The second advantage is that the dataset contains
a long time series which, importantly, includes two substantial house price downturns. The ﬁrst occurred
between 1989 and 1992, while the second is the current crisis, which began in 2006. This stands in sharp
contrast to other datasets which, because of left-censoring, can only be used with relatively recent data.1
The long time series allows us to address the oft-made claim that this episode is fundamentally diﬀerent
from ones that preceded it. Finally, a third and signiﬁcant beneﬁt of the Warren Data is that it allows us
to observe and match all liens on a given property, providing us with accurate measures of the cumulative
loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios that are essential for calculating a borrower’s equity position. The LPS dataset,
by contrast, does not allow the researcher to match ﬁrst and second liens, and furthermore, does not even
ﬂag the presence of a second lien.2
Another innovation in this paper is the use of what we will refer to as “homeownership experiences”
rather than individual loans as the unit of analysis. A homeownership experience is a chain of mortgages
that begins with a purchase mortgage and terminates either with the sale of the property and discharge of all
outstanding liens, foreclosure, or with right-censoring. The advantage of homeownership experiences for our
questions results from the fact that the typical homeowner reﬁnances several times after purchasing a home.
Some borrowers do this to take advantage of lower mortgage interest rates, and others to improve their
homes, but for subprime reﬁnances, the reason is often related to adverse household ﬁnancial shocks (such
as job loss, divorce, medical problems, etc.). This leads to a potential problem in analyzing the eﬀects of
subprime loans on foreclosure rates: borrowers who obtained subprime loans because of ﬁnancial problems
may have otherwise defaulted on their previous mortgages. Thus, we would attribute a foreclosure to a
subprime loan, even though the default may have occurred anyway. In other words, both the foreclosure
and the subprime loan share the same cause. One possible solution would be to look at loan-level data and
exclude reﬁnances, but since most subprime purchase loans end with a reﬁnance and not foreclosure, such a
tactic would underestimate the eﬀect of subprime loans on foreclosures.
Our evidence that falling prices are at the center of the crisis does not mean that subprime lending did
not play an important part. But, we show that the role of the subprime market is somewhat more subtle
than its characterization in the poor underwriting explanation. In past work, we have shown that subprime
mortgages were not inherently problematic or “designed to fail,” as some have argued, but in this paper
we do ﬁnd that they end up in foreclosure more frequently because of their higher sensitivity to falling
house prices. We experiment with diﬀerent speciﬁcations of a proportional hazard model and conclude that
1The Lender Processing Services (LPS) dataset, for example, has broad coverage of the U.S. mortgage market (unlike the
LP dataset), including a large prime, conforming subset, but is only usable starting with the 2005 vintage.
2The LP dataset has only partial information on the existence and size of second liens at origination
2a dummy variable for whether the home was purchased with a subprime mortgage in a single model that
includes both prime and subprime homeownerships is the most eﬀective way to model the eﬀect of subprime
borrowing.
Our estimates show that a subprime homeownership is approximately six times more likely to end in
foreclosure and, because we are using a proportional hazard speciﬁcation, this implies that the eﬀect of any
other risk factor goes up by a factor of six when we compare prime and subprime loans. For example, our
estimates imply that a homeowner with 20 percent negative equity is 10 times more likely to default than a
borrower with 20 percent positive equity. Combining this with our estimate of the eﬀect of a subprime loan
implies that a subprime borrower with 20 percent negative equity is 60 times more likely to default than
a prime borrower with 20 percent positive equity. It is easy to see from this how one might compare 100
percent LTV subprime borrowers in Massachusetts from 2005 and 80 percent LTV prime buyers from 2004,
which correspond roughly to the former and latter examples in the last sentence, and conclude from the
60-fold diﬀerence in foreclosures that subprime was “toxic.” But, in fact, had the two loans been originated
in the same year, with the same LTV, the diﬀerence would be dramatically smaller.
Overall, we show that one can decompose the causes of the increase in foreclosures in Massachusetts that
started in 2007 into the eﬀects of lower underwriting standards and the eﬀects of falling prices, but, because
the two interact, the eﬀects are subtle. We start by comparing the 2002 and 2005 vintages of home buyers and
show that the quarterly foreclosure hazard for the former never exceeded 0.05 percent in the ﬁrst 14 quarters
after purchase, whereas foreclosure rates for the latter group regularly exceeded 0.6 percent. We take the
2005 vintage and give them the price paths experienced by the 2002 vintage, but leave the distribution of
homeownership characteristics the same. This exercise isolates the eﬀect of underwriting because the 2005
vintage had 5 times as many subprime buyers as the 2002 vintage. According to our estimates, foreclosure
rates would rise relative to 2002 levels, but still remain almost an order of magnitude below those seen in
2005. We view this as evidence that declining underwriting standards alone could not have caused the crisis;
had 2005 buyers received the 2002 price experience, they would have had relatively low foreclosure rates,
despite the large share of subprime mortgages. The second counterfactual exercise is to give the 2002 buyers
the house price experience of the 2005 vintage of home buyers. In this case, the model generates foreclosure
rates that, while are only half of what we actually observed, are still gigantic relative to historical averages, or
to the 2002 vintage, and would have constituted a major public policy issue. All that said, the gap between
the 2002 vintage with 2005 prices and the 2005 vintage with 2005 prices illustrates how subprime lending
aggravated the eﬀects of the price decline, essentially doubling the number of foreclosures.
To motivate our empirical model, we construct a simple model of homeownership termination. Our
innovation here is to ﬁx the problem that option theoretic models of default imply no role for household
characteristics by embedding one in a portfolio choice framework. In our model, household characteristics
aﬀect the stochastic discount factors used to discount the costs and beneﬁts of continuing to make mortgage
payments. The set of characteristics includes the household’s ﬁnancial situation, and thus provides a theo-
retically robust argument for the heuristic “double-trigger” model used by practitioners. This model posits
that foreclosure occurs when a borrower faces negative equity and cash-ﬂow problems. But one important
point of our model is that we do not distinguish between “strategic” and “non-strategic” default because
borrowers have access to unsecured credit and so a mortgage payment is always, strictly speaking, aﬀordable.
In our world, a borrower in ﬁnancial distress with negative equity will choose not to default if they believe,
for example, that house prices will rise rapidly and that they will eventually have positive equity. On the
other hand, a borrower with high ﬁnancial wealth may default in the same situation if he or she believes
that house prices are going to continue to fall.
The key insight from the model is that negative equity is a necessary condition for default, because selling
3dominates defaulting if a borrower has positive equity. However, negative equity is not suﬃcient for default,
because future house price appreciation may make it proﬁtable to continue making mortgage payments. We
argue that cash-ﬂow, or the lack thereof, then determines whether it is optimal to default – if a borrower
must make extreme sacriﬁces in terms of current consumption to realize beneﬁts in the distant future, it
may not make sense to continue paying the mortgage, but if the sacriﬁce of current consumption is small, it
may make sense to continue making payments.
The model predicts that if HPA is high we will observe few foreclosures, even if people have cash-ﬂow
problems. The theory also suggests that a fall in HPA will not generate foreclosures unless we also have
cash-ﬂow problems. Thus, the presence of cash ﬂow problems is a necessary condition for negative HPA
to induce foreclosures. The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows that some fraction of borrowers (at least two
percent) always have cash-ﬂow problems. Although cash-ﬂow problems did appear to increase in 2006 and
2007, the scale of the increase in foreclosures during this period is an order of magnitude larger than the
increase in delinquencies.
We estimate a competing risks model of homeownership termination which is similar to the mortgage
termination models common in the real estate literature except that the two outcomes are foreclosure and
sale rather than foreclosure and prepayment. Our results show that foreclosure is highly sensitive to un-
employment and a foreclosure hazard that is essentially zero for equity levels greater than 25% but then
rising sharply after that. Interestingly the sale hazard displays a similar kink at the same point suggesting
that many foreclosures involve borrowers who would have sold if they had positive equity. This relationship,
with reduced sales oﬀsetting increased foreclosures, should mitigate the concern that foreclosures increase
the supply of homes on the market.
One often-made argument that runs counter to our claims in this paper is that the credit expansion may
not have directly caused the foreclosure boom, but did so indirectly by causing the bubble which led to the
negative HPA starting in 2006. While intuitively appealing, this theory has many problems. First, while
economic theory can explain why a credit expansion will lead to higher prices, no theory exists that links
credit expansions robustly to bubbles. Second, there is good reason to think the causality went from rising
prices to relaxed underwriting and not the other way around. Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund and Willen (2008)
use contemporary reports by investment banks to show that optimistic beliefs about house prices motivated
investment in subprime ABS. If the investment banks had known that house prices were going to fall as
they did, they would never have invested in the securities. In other words, it was beliefs about house price
appreciation that led to the observable decline in lending standards not the converse.
We proceed as follows. We describe a simple model of ownership termination in Section 2. We then map
out our empirical strategy in Section 3, paying particular attention to our use of the ownership experience
as opposed to the loan as the unit of analysis. In Section 4, we describe our dataset. Section 5 provides the
basic results of the empirical model. We focus on the key identiﬁcation issues in Section 6. In Section 7, we
make our case that house prices are at the heart of the crisis by conducting counterfactual exercises using
our estimated model. Section 8 concludes.
2. A Two-Period Model of the Default Decision
Why would a household default on a home mortgage? According to what we will call the “frictionless
option model” (FOM), a borrower should default if the value of the house H falls short of the value of the
mortgage V on that house. This statement is often understood to mean that the borrower should default if
the value of the house falls short of the unpaid principal balance U, that is, if the homeowner has negative
4equity. But, as Kau, Keenan and Kim (1994) explain,3 this interpretation is wrong: V is the present value
of future payments discounted using the market stochastic discount factor. Since borrowers have the option
to reﬁnance the mortgage and to default in the future, V is always less than U, so negative equity is not a
suﬃcient condition for default.
The FOM is useful in that it provides an explanation for why homeowners tolerate negative equity,
and does well in explaining default behavior qualitatively, but not quantitatively. The problem is that
the FOM assumes that the “economic environment facing a homeowner is described by two variables: the
interest rate and the house value” (Kau, Keenan, and Kim, 1994). Essentially, the FOM implies that
two diﬀerent households who bought similar houses in the same market, at around the same time, on the
same terms, will both default at the same time. Such a prediction, however, is not consistent with the
data. Moreover, since individual shocks such as unemployment, divorce, and illness are quite important
to the household’s default decision, the deviations from the FOM occur in a systematic way.4 To rectify
this predictive deﬁciency, researchers have turned to two alternative explanations for variation in default
rates among otherwise similar borrowers. The ﬁrst incorporates “trigger events”—divorce, illness, and spells
of unemployment are the typical examples—which make some borrowers more vulnerable to default. The
second is the concept of “ruthless” default, which posits that to actually follow the advice of the FOM, a
borrower must be cold-blooded and devoid of emotion. Neither of these explanations is satisfying from a
theoretical standpoint, the former because it does not explain why the trigger events lead to default, and
the latter because it appeals to a parameter termed “ruthlessness,” a concept which is diﬃcult to deﬁne
formally, let alone quantify.5
We develop a simple, two-period model to formally explain the channel by which trigger events may lead
to default, and to guide us in our choice of control variables for the empirical analysis. The model retains the
basic structure of the FOM but yields the intuitive prediction that ﬁnancially strapped borrowers are more
likely to default, conditional on a given level of house prices and interest rates. To perform this analysis, we
embed the ﬁnancial contracts from the FOM into a portfolio choice model with constraints. As shown by He
and Pearson (1991) and others, portfolio constraints imply that households use diﬀerent stochastic discount
factors to value assets. Put diﬀerently, individual household valuations of identical assets typically won’t be
identical. The upshot of this implication is that while the intuition that a borrower will default if the value
of the mortgage exceeds the value of the house still remains true, both the value of the house and the value
of the mortgage will diﬀer across households depending on unique characteristics and the individual ﬁnancial
situation of the particular household. For example, possessing less ﬁnancial wealth reduces the value of the
house relative to the value of the mortgage, and makes default more likely.
We now establish our model and derive our basic result about the default decision. At the end of this
section, we return to the FOM and show that our characterization of default, suitably adjusted, is the same
as the FOM characterization of default.
We consider a two-period model, in which the household enters period 0 living in a house with a market
price H0, and holds an interest-only mortgage with unpaid principal balance U, interest rate rm, and with
interest due in period zero. The household receives labor income y0, and is assumed to have wealth w. For
simplicity, we assume that there is only one type of house in the model, and that the house is also available
3The FOM model of Kau, Keenan and Kim applied the contingent claims framework of Black and Scholes (1973), Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), and Epperson et al. (1995). See Kau and Keenan (1995) for a survey of the mortgage pricing
literature.
4See Vandell (1995) for a survey of the empirical default literature, and a discussion about the importance of individual
variables in the default decision.
5The literature does stress the potential importance of transaction costs in modeling default. However, the concept of
transaction costs is somewhat vague in the literature. Often transaction costs refer to the direct costs of defaulting, in terms of
default penalties and mobility costs. In other cases such costs refer more broadly to frictions in the default decision.
5for rent at price ρ. In period 0, the household may choose to 1) sell the house and rent, 2) default on the
mortgage and rent, or 3) continue paying the mortgage and keep the house. In addition, the household
simultaneously chooses an optimal level of consumption and saving, where it can borrow θB > 0 dollars at
unsecured interest rate RB, or save θL ≥ 0 dollars at interest rate RL. We assume that the household cannot
reﬁnance the mortgage. In period 1, the household receives income y1 and the market value of the house is
H1. For simplicity, we assume that the household knows the value of the house in period 1 with certainty
in period 0. This assumption does not change the main results derived from the model. If the price of the
house is stochastic, then expectations of future house prices, instead of the actual present value, will matter
in the household’s default decision.6 In period 1, the household can either sell the house or default on the
mortgage.7 After making this choice, the household consumes its net savings and income, and the model
ends. Formally, we consider three diﬀerent budget constraints. If the household keeps the house, it faces
this set of constraints:
c0 = y0 + w − rmU + θB − θL (1)
c1 = y1 + (H1 − U)
+ − θBRB + θLRL. (2)
If the household elects to sell, it faces this set of constraints:
c0 = y0 + w + H0 − U − ρ + θB − θL (3)
c1 = y1 − θBRB + θLRL. (4)
Finally, if it elects to default, the household’s constraints are:
c0 = y0 + w − ρ + θB − θL (5)
c1 = y1 − θBRB + θLRL. (6)
We assume a utility function that is additively separable across housing consumption and non-housing
consumption as well as across periods. We assume a log speciﬁcation, in which housing enters the period









For the case in which the household elects to keep the house in period 0, it will choose to sell in the ﬁnal
period if the house is worth more than the mortgage, and, if not, it will default. If instead, the household
elects to default or sell the house in period 0, then we assume that it must rent a house of the same size (or
value) at a price ρ (in order to obtain shelter services).
The ﬁrst result here is that a borrower will default in the ﬁrst period only if H0 < U. In other words,
negative equity is a necessary condition for default. However, by no means is negative equity a suﬃcient
condition for default. The top panel of Figure 1, for example, shows that even in years in which house
prices appreciated substantially, some borrowers did in fact default on home mortgages. High house price
appreciation means that, in general, household equity goes up, but mortgage equity withdrawal, judgments,
6In the case of stochastic house prices, the household’s default decision will also depend on the variance of the house price
shock.
7For simplicity, we assume that there is no penalty associated with default. In reality, default may have a signiﬁcant negative
impact on the ability of a household to borrow in the future. If we impose a penalty in the model, the decision to default will
be a function of the magnitude of the penalty.
6tax delinquency, and arrears on the mortgage can all lead to default. Overall, in the years with the highest
house price appreciation, we see historically low levels of default.
We now focus on the interesting special case, where H0 < U, H1 > U, and rmU > ρ. The ﬁrst condition
means that the household will never sell in the ﬁrst period, since the house is worth less than the mortgage.
The second two conditions imply that it is costly to keep the house, but there is some future beneﬁt to doing





The interpretation of RK is straightforward. The dividend on keeping the house is the payoﬀ from selling the
house in the next period, and the price is the cost of paying the mortgage less the rent the household would
have to pay if it sold the house. Under these conditions, we advance and prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If
RB > RK > RL, (8)
then there exists w∗ such that if w > w∗, the borrower keeps the house and if w < w∗, the borrower defaults.
The implicit function w*(y0,y1,β,rm,H,U) has the following properties: w∗
y0 < 0, w∗
y1 > 0, w∗
β < 0, w∗
H < 0,
w∗
U > 0, and w∗
rm > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows how the incidence of foreclosure depends on household-level parameters. If we assume
some distribution of households with respect to the exogenous parameters, then we can now say something
about what determines the default rate. First, if we lower individual household wealth, we get more defaults.
Second, anything that reduces the relative value of future consumption (higher future income, lower current
income, less patience) tends to increase the likelihood of a default decision that leads to a foreclosure. Third,
as one would expect, increasing the mortgage interest rate rm makes default and thus foreclosure more likely.
Finally, reductions in rental prices make holding on to the house more expensive and increase the likelihood
of default.
In the model, the eﬀect of changes in house prices on foreclosures is somewhat more subtle. Holding H1
constant, changes in H0 actually have no eﬀect on foreclosures. The logic for this is simple: a reduction in
the value of the house makes no diﬀerence if the household is already out of the money (that is, if H0 < U).
What matters, in fact, is H1: the key here is beliefs about future prices rather than the current market price.
Essentially, holding onto the house makes sense in the model only if the household believes that somewhere
down the line, the house will be worth more than the outstanding mortgage, because that is what justiﬁes
the premium paid over renting. In the end, H0 matters only if one believes that there is a relationship
between current and future housing prices. As most buyers pay close attention to recent trends in house
prices, a reduction in H0, conditional on H0 < U, will likely increase the foreclosure rate.
Above, we argued that our model was closely connected to the FOM. According to the FOM, we need
to compare the value of the mortgage with the current market value of the house. In the FOM, we can
establish those values by looking at market prices, but in our model it is more complicated. Take the value
of the house: the house is an asset that pays ρ this period and H1 next period when the borrower sells the
house. If the household can ﬁnance the house purchase out of savings, then the value is:




7Note that the value of the house to the borrower is not necessarily equal to the current market price of the
house. Such an outcome would be an arbitrage opportunity in a frictionless world. If H > H0, for example,
one could borrow H0 dollars at interest rate RL, buy a house, and make a certain proﬁt of RL(H − H0).
Another household that has to ﬁnance the house purchase by borrowing would value the house at:




Using our deﬁnitions of the value of the house and the mortgage, we can show that condition (8) is
equivalent to the FOM criterion that a suﬃcient condition for default is that V > H. For a household that
can ﬁnance a house with accumulated savings, the condition RK > RL and V > H are equivalent. To see















Our analysis is unique in that, to the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study capable of tracking
the same borrowers across diﬀerent mortgage instruments for the same residential property. The empirical
default literature has primarily used loan-level data to simultaneously model the decision either to default
or to prepay a mortgage.8 Instead of characterizing the prepayment and default probabilities of a single
loan, in this paper we are able to characterize sale and default probabilities across the time horizons of
entire “ownership experiences.” In using this term, we are referring to the time that an individual household
lives in a particular house. We believe this is a signiﬁcant methodological contribution to modeling default
behavior for at least two reasons.
First, it is unlikely that the probability of defaulting on a subsequent mortgage is independent of the
risk associated with prior mortgages purchased by the household. For example, many borrowers choose to
extract equity from their homes to smooth consumption by reﬁnancing their mortgages; this is a practice
called mortgage equity withdrawal. While undoubtedly, many borrowers doing so are simply consuming
the returns to their housing investment as part of their optimal consumption plan, other households may
have experienced a recent adverse transitory income shock, and are extracting their housing equity as a
precautionary buﬀer. This latter scenario suggests that, in some cases, mortgage loans that end “successfully”
in the form of prepayment may actually be a signal of ﬁnancial distress. In such a case, the subsequent
mortgage actually has a high probability of default. Thus, it is more informative to observe all of the
mortgages issued to a given borrower on a given property to calculate unbiased probabilities of default.
In addition, using loan-level data could also overestimate default probabilities for borrowers who purchase
their homes with subprime mortgages, if the data do not distinguish between purchase and reﬁnance loans.
For instance, if many prime borrowers reﬁnance into subprime mortgages as a result of ﬁnancial duress,
8The term prepay is used in the literature to describe a situation when a borrower prematurely pays oﬀ a mortgage. Reasons
for prepayment include the sale of the home, a reﬁnance into a new loan, or early repayment of a loan.
8then subprime loans will overestimate default probabilities of borrowers who purchase homes with subprime
mortgages.
Thus, for these reasons, we conduct our analysis over entire ownership experiences, rather than individual
loans taken out at one point in the ownership cycle. In our unique data, discussed in detail below, we ﬁnd
that the average number of mortgages over the life of completed ownerships is slightly less than 3, which
suggests the potential importance of this diﬀerentiation.
3.2. A Competing Risks Model of Home Ownership Termination
Most of the recent literature on the determinants of mortgage default has used loan-level data to simul-
taneously model default and prepayment decisions in a reduced-form framework. Deng, Quigley, and Van
Order (2000), Deng and Quigley (2004), and Pennington-Cross and Ho (2006) are some recent examples of
studies that have analyzed the decisions to default and prepay jointly. These studies emphasize that the
default option and prepayment option are linked by mutual exclusivity, since by exercising one choice, the
borrower forfeits the opportunity to exercise the other one. In actuality, however, the prepayment option is
exercised for one of two reasons, either because the borrower is reﬁnancing or because he or she is selling the
property and moving. However, because of data limitations, the vast majority of studies do not distinguish
between these two possibilities.
We have argued above that it is problematic to use loan-level data to answer the questions that we pose
in this study. Thus, we use data on homeownership experiences instead, and estimate the joint probability of
sale and foreclosure using a competing risks, proportional hazard, duration model. Sale and foreclosure are
competing risks in the sense that these are the only possibilities (other than death) by which an ownership
experience can end, and exercising one of these choices precludes the possibility of exercising the other.
The model speciﬁcation that we use is taken from Meyer (1995), and is very similar to the speciﬁcation
of Pennington-Cross and Ho (2006) and Yu (2006). It is a competing risks, proportional hazard, duration
model that allows for time-varying covariates and unobserved heterogeneity, and is based on the studies of
Han and Hausman (1990), Sueyoshi (1992), and McCall (1996). As in these papers, our data are observed in
discrete intervals. In principle, we could estimate the model using monthly intervals, but in order to obtain
precise house price indexes, it is necessary to use quarterly intervals.9
The hazard function is given by the probability that homeowner i terminates the ownership experience
at time t, conditional on the fact that he or she has lived in the home until time t. In our model, there are
two hazard functions corresponding to the two competing actions that the homeowner can take to end the
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where homeowner i can terminate the ownership by selling the home, r = S, or defaulting on the mortgage
and allowing the lender to foreclose, r = F.
In our sample, the ﬁrst realized termination time of owner experience i is when the homeowner either
sells the home or defaults on the loan, or when the end of the sample is reached. Letting T F and T S,
denote discrete random variables representing the duration to foreclosure and sale, respectively, and T C
9An important diﬀerence between our speciﬁcation and the speciﬁcation in Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) is that
in our present analysis we do not model unobserved heterogeneity. Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity using a multi-
dimensional, discrete distribution, such as the one used in Deng, Quigley, Van Order (2000), with a data set that is as large
as ours is extremely computationally burdensome. The time required to estimate the current speciﬁcation without unobserved
heterogeneity is already signiﬁcant. We have experimented with allowing unobserved heterogeneity for very small samples of
the data, and have not found substantially diﬀerent results.
9denote censoring due to the end of the sample, the ﬁrst realized termination is T ∗




probability that homeowner i reaches T ∗
i conditional on a vector of observed covariates, Xi(t), is a function of
both the foreclosure hazard, λF
i (t|Xi(t)), and the sale hazard, λS
i (t|Xi(t)), and is called the survival function:
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0(t)exp(Xi(t)′ ∗ βr), r ∈ {S,F}. (11)
This speciﬁcation for the hazards, which is common in the literature, implicitly assumes that the foreclo-
sure hazard λF
i (t|Xi(t)) and the sale hazard λS
i (t|Xi(t)) each take the same form as a function of the duration
of the ownership period for all N ownership experiences in our sample. In other words, the analysis rests on
the assumption that there is a hazard common to all homeownership experiences, i ∈ N for default λF
0 (t),
and for sale λS
0(t). These hazards are referred to as the baseline hazards for foreclosure and sale, respectively.
Our analysis estimates the eﬀect of the covariates on the joint decision to sell and default as a proportion
of the two respective baseline hazards. We specify the baseline hazards in a non-parametric manner, which
basically entails estimating a set of dichotomous variables (one for each discrete quartly interval).10
Since we do not observe the data continuously, but only in discrete intervals, we must account for this
when forming the likelihood function. In what follows, we use the methods employed in Meyer (1995).
Suppose we only observe T ∗
i in the interval It, where It = [t,t+1) for t = 0,1,...,T C −1 and IT C = [T C,∞).
If T ∗
i ǫ It, then we let ki = t. We follow Sueyoshi (1992) and assume that any time-varying covariates
are constant within the intervals I. This implies that the data available to the econometrician for the ith
homeowner include (ki,δi,Xi(t)) where ki is equal to the integer part of T ∗
i , Xi(t) denotes the path of the
explanatory variables, and δr
i = 1 when individual i is observed to fail due to the rth risk (foreclosure or
sale), and δr
i = 0 otherwise.
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exp{−(exp[γF(t) + Xi(t)′βF] + exp[γS(t) + Xi(t)′βS])}. (14)
10We also estimate a speciﬁcation of the model in which we restrict the shape of the baseline hazard to a third-degree
polynomial in the age of the ownership, such that λr
0(t) = exp(α0 + α1,it + α2,it2 + α3,it3). The results do not materially
change.
104. Dataset
Our data come from the The Warren Group, and are comprised of historical registry of deeds records
from January 1987 through December 2008 for the entire state of Massachusetts, as well as 2007 and 2008
Massachusetts assessor data. The registry of deeds records contain information on all residential home sales
and mortgage originations, allowing us to track every mortgage issued on a given residential property over
our sample period,11 while the assessor data contain information regarding characteristics of the property.
In the data, we see transaction amounts and dates for mortgages and property sales, but we do not have
information on mortgage characteristics such as the type of mortgage or the contracted interest rate. The
data do contain information about the identity of the mortgage lender that we use to construct indicators
for homes purchased with subprime mortgages, which we discuss in detail below. Information regarding the
type of sale is also found in the data. Thus, we can distinguish between normal sale transactions, nominal
sale transactions, such as transfers among family members, and foreclosure sales.
In this paper we use foreclosure sales as a proxy for default. Foreclosure sales in the data are ﬁnal
transactions, in the sense that they signify the eviction of the household or homeowner from the property.
The data also cover foreclosure petitions going back to 2004. Foreclosure petitions are public notices declaring
the initiation of foreclosure proceedings that by law mortgage lenders are required to make in Massachusetts.
Petitions are usually ﬁled once the borrower has become delinquent on three monthly mortgage payments.
While a foreclosure petition is certainly a sign of serious delinquency, it is not a good indication of default,
as there are many instances in the data in which a borrower receives a foreclosure petition, but does not
end up in foreclosure proceedings. The typical time between the ﬁling of a petition and a foreclosure deed
(if it occurs) is about 2 months. Thus, a borrower who receives a petition has some time to decide whether
or not to catch up on the late mortgage payments and forestall default. For this reason, we believe that the
appropriate proxies for default in our data are foreclosure sales.
The fact that we see every sale transaction in the data allows us to construct the ownership experiences
deﬁned and discussed above, by identifying sales of the same property in the data. Figure 2 contains an
example of how we construct ownership experiences.
Between January 1987 and December 2008 we observe more than 6 million mortgages and almost 1.6
million ownership experiences in Massachusetts. Table 1 lists the number of sales and foreclosures by year
as well as by vintage, beginning in 1989.12 Our data encompasses the housing bust of the early 1990s in
the Northeast, and this event is apparent from increased foreclosure numbers. There is a large increase in
foreclosures beginning in 1991 and peaking in 1992, with over 9,000 foreclosures statewide. Data from the
housing boom that took place in the early 2000s display the opposite extreme. In this period foreclosures
dropped signiﬁcantly, reaching a low point of fewer than 600 in 2003. We see evidence of the current
foreclosure crisis at the very end of our sample. Foreclosures in 2008 surpass the levels witnessed in the early
1990s.
The top panel of Figure 1 displays a time series plot of the foreclosure rate.13 The top panel of Figure 1
also contains a graph of annualized house price growth over our sample period.14 This ﬁgure clearly shows
11Residential properties include condominiums, single-family homes, and multi-family homes.
12The data on sales are fairly reliable before 1989; however, the number of foreclosures in the data before 1989 seems
implausibly low, so we restrict our analysis of foreclosures to 1989 and later.
13Here we have simply divided the foreclosure numbers from Table 1 by the number of residential parcels in that year. A
parcel is deﬁned as a real unit of property used for the assessment of property taxes, and a typical parcel consists of a plot of
land deﬁned by a deed and any buildings located on the land. Information on parcel counts is obtained from the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue.
14Our detailed data of repeat sales allow us to use the Case-Shiller weighted-repeat-sales (WRS) methodology to calculate
house price indexes at various levels of aggregation. Figure 1 displays house prices at the state level, but for the purposes
11the two housing market cycles that the Massachusetts economy has experienced over the past 20 years. The
two series are negatively correlated, with the foreclosure rates moving inversely, at a slight lag with house
price growth. In 1991, house price growth reached a low of almost -9 percent, and the foreclosure rate peaked
one year later in 1992 at more than 0.6 percent of active ownership experiences. The latest ﬁgures for 2008
show the state’s house price growth and the foreclosure rate approaching the levels of the early 1990s, as
growth is approaching -5 percent, while the foreclosure rate is approaching 0.45 percent.
4.1. Explanatory Variables
While the theoretical model discussed above is too simple to yield formal, testable predictions, it is
useful in identifying the types of variables that should be expected to impact an individual borrower’s
decision to default. It tells us, for example, that a borrower’s current wealth, income, and housing equity
should all be important determinants of default risk. The wealth threshold derived from the model is a
function of both current and future income. This threshold also suggests that income variability, although
formally left out of our model, will also inﬂuence the decision to default.15 Unfortunately our current
dataset does not contain borrower-speciﬁc demographic or ﬁnancial information, nor does it contain detailed
information regarding mortgage characteristics. We attempt to proxy for borrower-speciﬁc variables with
more aggregated information at either the town level or the zip code level. For example, we use information
on income at the zip code level and unemployment at the town level to proxy for diﬀerences in ﬁnancial
conditions of households across locations, and we use the racial makeup of zip codes to proxy for diﬀerences
in demographics. In order to proxy for the credit risk of a home buyer, we distinguish between borrowers
who purchased a home with a subprime mortgage versus those who did so with a prime mortgage. We
provide a detailed discussion of our deﬁnition of subprime, and how it is related to other deﬁnitions in the
literature below.
4.1.1. Initial Owner Equity and Cumulative House Price Appreciation
Previous studies in the literature, such as Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000), use house price indexes
at the MSA-level and the unpaid mortgage balance computed from the contract terms of each loan to
estimate the probability of negative homeowner equity, which proxies for whether or not the default option
is “in the money.” While our dataset does not include the necessary contract information to calculate the
remaining mortgage balance each period, we argue that even if it did, including such information in our
estimation would introduce endogeneity issues. Since we perform our estimation over entire ownership
experiences, to compute net homeowner equity in each period would require including mortgage balance
information for every loan obtained over the duration of each ownership. The choice to reﬁnance, as well as
the choice of the reﬁnanced mortgage terms, are endogenous decisions. Many borrowers, for example, who
suﬀer negative income shocks or other adverse life events may choose to extract equity and obtain larger
subsequent mortgages. In these cases the mortgage balances would simply be conveying information about
negative income shocks or other adverse shocks aﬀecting the individual borrower. Thus, including the time
proﬁle of net equity in our estimation would result in biased estimates.16 Instead, we choose to include initial
homeowner equity, and the true exogenous component of net equity over time, house price appreciation.17
of estimation, we are able to calculate house price indexes at the city level for approximately two-thirds of the cities in
Massachusetts. A detailed discussion of the WRS methodology and our aggregation assumptions can be found in Appendix A.
15Income variability has been identiﬁed in the literature as having an important impact on the probability of default. Herzog
and Early (1970) found that borrowers in occupations with greater income volatility were more likely to be delinquent than
other borrowers.
16In addition, while the Warren dataset does include information on every mortgage obtained over the life of the homeown-
ership, it does not include the date of mortgage terminations, it is not possible to obtain a precise estimate of a borrower’s
overall mortgage balance over time.
17See section 6 below for a detailed discussion of the exogeneity of our measure of house price appreciation.
12Our dataset has enough information to construct reasonable proxies for initial net housing equity and
cumulative house price appreciation. Since we see dates and amounts in our data, we are able to calculate
initial loan-to-value ratios (LTV) for each ownership experience in which we observe a purchase transaction
(meaning the ownership experiences that are not left-censored). Another novel aspect of the dataset, is that
unlike virtually all loan-level datasets, it allows for a very precise measurement of cumulative initial LTV
at origination.18 The LTVs are cumulative in the sense that we observe all of the originating mortgages
issued at the time of purchase, so if there is a second or even a third mortgage that accompanies the ﬁrst
mortgage, we will add these amounts to our LTV calculation.19 In addition to initial cumulative LTVs, we
use repeat-sale price indexes to calculate from the date of purchase the average cumulative price appreciation
at each quarter in the town containing each property in our data, to construct a measure of nominal equity,
Eit, given by
Eit =
Vi0   (1 + CHPA
jt ) − Li0
Li0
, (15)
In constructing this variable we use only information conveyed by the initial LTV ratio,Li0
Vi0 and the cumulative
amount of house price appreciation experienced (at the town-level), CHPA
jt .
Theoretical models of default predict a non-linear relationship between equity and foreclosure. Speciﬁ-
cally, an increase in equity for a borrower in a position of negative equity should have a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
eﬀect from an increase in equity for a borrower who has positive equity in his or her home. For this reason,
we allow for the eﬀect of equity on default to change depending on the equity level of the borrower. To do
this we specify equity as a linear spline in the model, with ﬁve intervals: (-∞, -10%), [-10%, 0%), [0%, 10%),
[10%, 25%), and [25%, ∞).20
Table 1 displays summary statistics for initial LTVs by year. The table contains means and medians
for all ownership experiences initiated in a given year, as well as for ownership experiences that ended in a
foreclosure. The diﬀerences are substantial. For example, for ownership experiences beginning in 2003, the
average initial LTV ratio was 0.81, and the median was 0.85. In contrast, for the ownership experiences that
began in 2003 and subsequently defaulted, the average initial LTV ratio was 0.93, and the median was 0.95.
4.1.2. Investors
In addition to the ﬁnancial characteristics associated with an individual borrower, the reason for purchas-
ing the residential property should also impact the default decision. Borrowers who are not owner-occupants,
but who purchased the property strictly for investment purposes, are likely greater default risks, ceteris
paribus. Since non-owner occupants do not face mobility costs and do not have an emotional stake in the
property, their cost of default is likely lower relative to the cost to owner-occupants. This is also apparent
from the model, as an investor who defaults would not have to pay ρ to rent a home. We do not have di-
rect information in the data to distinguish properties bought to serve as primary residences or investments;
however, we can proxy for these diﬀerent purposes using property characteristics. The Warren Group data
contains a limited amount of information on the characteristics of each property, allowing us to distinguish
between single-family homes, multi-family homes, and condominiums. We hypothesize that owners of multi-
family properties are more likely to be investors, as multi-family units provide a stream of rental income.
18For example the popular LoanPerformance dataset has only partial information on the existence of second or third mort-
gages, while data from Loan Processing Services, another common source of loan-level data in the literature, has no information
on additional mortgages.
19Many studies have found evidence that initial LTV ratios alone are signiﬁcant predictors of default. Early examples in the
literature include von Furstenberg (1969) and Campbell, Dietrich, (1983). These studies interpret LTV ratios as acting as a
proxy for other, unobservable borrower-speciﬁc information, such as wealth or income. This is also our interpretation.
20The intervals are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but the results are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by assuming diﬀerent intervals.
13We also believe that condominiums may proxy in part for investors and real estate speculators, since the
condominium market is often hit hardest during a housing bust.
4.1.3. Labor Market Conditions
Besides including initial LTVs, cumulative price appreciation, and property characteristics, we obtain
information regarding certain characteristics of the town or zip code where each property is located. Since
we know the exact location of each property, we can group properties by town/city as well as by zip code,
allowing us to merge our data with data from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
We obtain town-level data on monthly unemployment rates going back to 1990 from the BLS. Unemployment
rates have been used previously in the literature as a proxy for income volatility.21 In addition, for some
households, periods of unemployment turn out to be permanent income shocks, which our portfolio-choice
model tells us will aﬀect the default decision. Instead of including the level of unemployment in our empirical
model, we choose to use the cumulative change in unemployment experienced in the town of residence since
the time of home purchase. This choice is based on our belief that ﬂows into and out of unemployment are
the relevant factors that aﬀect foreclosure. We choose to include a cumulative measure rather than quarterly
growth rates in order to smooth out some of the noise that is present in the quarterly unemployment measures
at the town-level.22
4.1.4. Demographics
We obtain demographic information at the zip code level from the 2000 U.S. Census, including median
household income and the percentage of minority households. Previous studies in the literature have found
evidence of racial discrimination in the mortgage lending business. These studies show that minority house-
holds are less likely than others to obtain approval for a mortgage, and those that are successful in obtaining
a mortgage are often given a loan with inferior terms relative to an equivalent non-minority household.23
Thus, using the intuition from our simple model, we would expect to observe higher default rates in zip
codes with larger percentages of minority households, ceteris paribus.
4.1.5. Interest Rates
The mortgage default literature has also identiﬁed the diﬀerence between the par value and the market
value of a loan as a signiﬁcant determinant of default risk. When the value of the mortgage rises above
the outstanding mortgage balance, the probability of default increases.24 The diﬀerence between par and
market value can be negative only when the prevailing market interest rate that the borrower is qualiﬁed to
receive falls below the original contract rate of the mortgage. Since we lack information about contracted
interest rates, we proxy for this eﬀect using prevailing aggregate interest rates. In the estimation, we include
the 6-month LIBOR rate, which is a short-term interest rate that has become a very popular index for
adjustable-rate mortgages, especially in the subprime mortgage market.25
4.1.6. Subprime Mortgages
There is no universally accepted deﬁnition of a subprime mortgage, so in order to analyze the subprime
mortgage market, we must ﬁrst choose an appropriate deﬁnition. The terms subprime borrower, subprime
21Williams, Beranek, and Kenkel (1974) found that unemployment rates in Pittsburgh had a positive eﬀect on default.
Campbell, Dietrich, (1983) and Deng, Quigley, and van Order (2000) also found evidence of a positive eﬀect of the unemployment
rate on default.
22The estimation results are not sensitive to the additional inclusion of unemployment levels at the town-level.
23See Munnell et al. (1996).
24See Quercia and Stegman (1992) for a discussion of this eﬀect.
25We have also estimated the model with other aggregate interest rates, such as the 10-year T-bill rate to capture changes
in the market values of ﬁxed-rate mortgages, but the results are largely unchanged.
14lender, and subprime mortgage, are often used interchangeably by analysts and researchers, but for the
purposes of this paper, it is important to make a distinction.
The term subprime borrower has traditionally been applied to a borrower that is perceived to be a higher
lending risk relative to the average borrower, usually because of a poor credit history. In the United States,
a subprime borrower today typically refers to an individual with a FICO score below 620, who has become
delinquent on some form of debt repayment in the previous 12 to 24 months, or who has even ﬁled for
bankruptcy in the last few years. There have always been small-scale venues for subprime borrowers; for
instance, pawn shops and payday lenders have both existed for a long time. However, until recently, subprime
borrowers were unable to systematically obtain large-scale loans such as mortgages. With reformed lending
laws and increasingly sophisticated ﬁnancial markets and instruments, a new mortgage lending channel that
was based on the concept of risk-based pricing emerged that serviced subprime borrowers in particular.
It is unclear exactly when the subprime mortgage market truly began, but in 1993 the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began tracking the subprime mortgage market, and developed
an annual list of subprime lenders, which were deﬁned as mortgage lenders that specialized in lending to
subprime borrowers.26 This list is calculated each year by identifying mortgage lenders that originate a large
percentage of “high-cost” loans.27 The Warren dataset has very accurate information about the identity
of each mortgage lender. Thus, we are able to use the HUD list of subprime mortgage lenders (by year)
to identify subprime mortgages in the data. While this list is not a perfect representation of the subprime
mortgage market, since some of the lenders identiﬁed as subprime also originate a small percentage of lower
cost loans, it does provide a very good representation of subprime lenders.28 In Appendix B we take a closer
look at this issue and perform a robustness check, where we use the limited interest rate information that is
available in our data for adjustable-rate mortgages, to construct a deﬁnition of a subprime mortgage based on
interest rate spreads, similar to the methods used by HMDA analysts. We ﬁnd that the mortgages identiﬁed
as subprime using the HUD list correspond very well to mortgages that we deﬁne as subprime based on
the spread between initial contract interest rates and a common benchmark index of prime mortgage rates.
Table 2 displays a list of the top ten subprime lenders in our data, in terms of the number of subprime
purchase mortgages originated. These ten lenders accounted for almost 70 percent of the total number of
subprime purchase mortgages that were originated in Massachusetts. As of October 2008, all ten lenders
have shut down their operations, which conﬁrms in our data what has been obvious in reality: the fact that
the current foreclosure crisis has taken the hardest toll on subprime borrowers and the lenders that serviced
them.
At this point, it is important to be very clear in our interpretation of this variable. In our empirical
model we interpret the estimates corresponding to the subprime indicator as correlations, and do not assign
a causal interpretation. It simply tells us the relative frequency of foreclosure for a borrower who used the
subprime lending channel compared with the frequency for a borrower who used the prime lending channel.
This variable likely includes omitted selection eﬀects, as borrowers who use the subprime market have poor
credit histories relative to other borrowers. It also likely measures omitted treatment eﬀects, since interest
rates in the subprime market are often signiﬁcantly higher than rates in the prime market, which results in
higher payments, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of default.
Table 3 displays the size of the Massachusetts subprime market, beginning in 1993, in terms of the
26It is important to stress that most, but not all, of a subprime mortgage lender’s business involves servicing subprime
borrowers. Yet many subprime lenders also service prime borrowers, meaning borrowers with a sound ﬁnancial credit history.
27HUD deﬁnes a “high-cost” loan to be a mortgage with an initial interest rate that is at least 300 basis points larger than
the yield of a treasury bill with a comparable maturity period. The reasoning behind this method is that lenders charge higher
interest rates to subprime borrowers to compensate for the elevated credit risk.
28It is the same method used by many researchers in the industry, including, for example, the Mortgage Banker’s Association.
15percentage of purchases ﬁnanced with subprime mortgages each year (column 1), as well as the subprime
market’s contribution to the total number of foreclosures in Massachusetts. In terms of purchase mortgages,
the peak of subprime lending occurred in the 2004–2006period, when between 10 and 15 percent of the state’s
purchase mortgage originations were made by subprime lenders. The last three columns in Table 3 show the
disproportionate impact that the subprime mortgage market has had on the recent rise in foreclosures. In
2006 and 2007, approximately 30 percent of Massachusetts foreclosures were on ownerships initially ﬁnanced
with subprime mortgages, up from only 10 percent in 2003 and 2004. While these percentages are high, we
see an increase when looking at the percentage of recent foreclosures on borrowers whose last mortgage was
issued by a subprime lender. In 2006 and 2007, this percentage was approximately 45 percent. If we broaden
the criteria even further and consider the contribution from borrowers who obtained a subprime mortgage at
any point in their ownership experience, the foreclosure percentage increases to approximately 59 percent.
This distinction emphasizes the importance of diﬀerentiating between diﬀerent segments of the subprime
market, and speciﬁcally between purchase loans and reﬁnance loans. For ownership experiences that begin
with mortgages obtained from a prime lender, subprime reﬁnances are often a signal of ﬁnancial distress,
especially for borrowers that extract equity with a subprime reﬁnance. It is likely that in the absence of a
subprime market, many of those borrowers that ended up defaulting would have defaulted on their previous
prime mortgages.29 In our empirical analysis we do not consider this group of borrowers, but instead focus
on ownerships that initially ﬁnanced their home purchase with a subprime mortgage.
4.2. Comparison of Massachusetts to the National Mortgage Market
As we discussed above, a big advantage of the Warren dataset comes from its coverage of the entire mort-
gage market. It includes all homeownerships ﬁnanced with a mortgage, and thus covers the subprime, alt-a,
and jumbo non-agency market segments as well as the prime conforming segment. However, a disadvantage
is that it only covers a single state. While our analysis is only performed with data from Massachusetts,
we believe that many of the results can be generalized to the national mortgage market. In this section we
will present some basic facts regarding the time series of subprime shares, delinquency rates, and foreclosure
rates in Massachusetts, in comparison to the nation as a whole, as well as to California, which is the state
with the largest subprime mortgage market. The purpose of this presentation is to give a sense of just how
representative the Massachusetts prime and subprime mortgage markets are of the national market.
Figure 3 contains three plots that summarize the state of the MA, CA, and U.S. mortgage markets
over the 2004 – 2008 period. The ﬁrst plot displays the share of outstanding mortgages that are prime in
each market, the second plot displays the share of past-due mortgages that are prime in each market, and
the third plot displays the share of foreclosure starts that have occurred on prime mortgages. The data
is taken from the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), and to obtain the corresponding subprime shares
from the ﬁgures, one only has to subtract the prime shares from 100. The ﬁgure shows a very high degree
of similarity between Massachusetts, California, and the entire U.S. in terms of the patterns of the share of
outstanding mortgages that are subprime (constant at about 10 percent over the period) and the share of
past-due mortgages that are subprime. In addition, the share of foreclosure starts that have occurred on
subprime mortgages in Massachusetts and California is very similar over the four-year period (the pattern
for the entire U.S. is much more volatile).
29This point is especially important in the context of the current public policy debate regarding whether or not subprime
borrowers should even be allowed to obtain mortgages and purchase homes, since borrowers that reﬁnanced from a prime to a
subprime lender should not be included in the discussion.
164.3. The Decision to Sell
While our main focus in this paper is speciﬁcally modeling the default decision that leads to foreclosure,
the competing risks nature of our estimation means that we must also address a household’s decision to
sell. The mobility literature emphasizes the importance of life-cycle factors and factors that aﬀect housing
demand in the decision to sell and change residence.30 Variables such as household size, age, marital status,
income, wealth, and education have been found to impact a household’s decision to move. Unfortunately,
our data do not contain such information at the household level. However, theory tells us that equity should
also have an important, non-linear impact on the decision to sell. If a homeowner in a position of negative
equity desires to move, he must come up with the diﬀerence between the sale amount and the remaining
nominal mortgage balance in order to meet his mortgage obligation. For this reason it is ﬁnancially beneﬁcial
for negative-equity homeowners to instead exercise their default option, and give their home to the mortgage
lender in exchange for the outstanding balance of their mortgage. In contrast, for homeowners with positive
equity, it is always better to sell and extract the positive equity, rather than to exercise the default option.
Thus, we would expect diﬀerent eﬀects of equity on the probability of sale for homeowners in positions of
negative equity compared to homeowners with positive equity.31 For this reason, we use the same equity
speciﬁcation (discussed above) in estimating the sale hazard as we use to estimate the foreclosure hazard.
5. Results
5.1. Non-parametric hazards
To gain insight about foreclosure and sale probabilities from our data, we calculate the non-parametric
Kaplan-Meier estimates by length of the ownership experience.32 We use a quarterly interval length in our
subsequent analysis, as this is the ﬁnest partition with which we are able to estimate the house price indexes.
Figure 4 contains the Kaplan-Meier hazard functions for foreclosure and sale, respectively, using our
entire sample of data.33 The foreclosure hazard exhibits positive duration dependence in the ﬁrst 4 years
of the ownership experience, peaking at a quarterly rate of almost 0.15 percent, and then negative duration
dependence for the remainder of the ownership period. This hump-shaped pattern is consistent with ﬁndings
from the mortgage default literature.34 The sale hazard has a similar pattern as it also exhibits positive
duration dependence early in the ownership experience (approximately 3 years), and negative duration
dependence later, although it does not decline as much as the foreclosure hazard.
30See, for example, Henderson and Ioannides (1989), Henly (1998), and Chan (1996).
31A study of U.K. homeowners (Henly, 1998), ﬁnds that households with negative equity have less mobility than those with
positive equity. This result suggests that house price appreciation may have a positive impact on the decision to sell. Henley
also ﬁnds weak evidence of a negative impact on mobility from regional unemployment rates.
32The Kaplan-Meier estimates are calculated as follows: We assume that hazards occur at discrete times tj where tj = t0+j,
j = 1,2,...,J. If we deﬁne the number of loans that have reached time tj without being terminated or censored as nj, and the
















33In estimating the foreclosure (sale) hazard, we treat sales (foreclosures) as “censored” data, based on the implicit assumption
that they are independent of each other. However, in our multi-variate analysis below, we relax this assumption.
34For example, von Furstenberg (1969) found that mortgage risk increased with the age of the mortgage, up to 3 or 4 years
after origination, after which it declined.
17Figure 5 displays Kaplan-Meier conditional hazard rates for foreclosure, broken down categorically for
some of the explanatory variables discussed in Section 4.1. This exercise should provide some initial insight
as to whether these variables have any potential to explain variations in foreclosure rates. In the upper
left panel of Figure 5 we see that hazard rates are much higher for ownership experiences that begin with
extremely high combined LTV ratios (1 or greater). This eﬀect seems particularly strong early on in the
ownership period. For example, conditional on surviving for two years, an ownership experience that begins
with an initial LTV ratio of one or greater is more than six times more likely to default relative to an
experience that begins with an LTV between 0.9 and 1. Initial combined LTV ratios between 0.9 and 1.0
have slightly lower hazard rates than those between 0.8 and 0.9, and initial LTV ratios of 0.8 or lower have
the lowest hazard rates.
To construct the upper right panel of Figure 5, we use our house price indices to compute homeowner’s
equity after purchase. The diﬀerences between the top two panels, which diﬀer in that the left one divides
the sample by equity at origination and the right one divides the sample by current equity, are instructive.
Origination LTV has always presented a problem for analysis of mortgage performance. Borrowers with low
equity may be more likely to default because they have less money to begin with, what we would call a
selection eﬀect, or because exercising the default option is more proﬁtable, a treatment eﬀect. The ﬁgures
show that the eﬀect of origination LTV, which has more to do with selection is initially strong but wears oﬀ,
whereas the eﬀect of updated equity, which has more to do with treatment, remains strong indeﬁnitely.
The lower left panel of Figure 5 displays diﬀerences in hazard rates for various unemployment rates.
From the plot, it appears that borrowers living in areas with very high unemployment rates (greater than 7
percent) are much more likely to default.
The lower right panel of Figure 5 displays the diﬀerences in hazard rates for borrowers that ﬁnanced
their house purchase using a mortgage from a subprime lender versus those that obtained a mortgage from
a prime lender. The diﬀerence is substantial. The hazard rate for borrowers using prime mortgages never
reaches 0.08 percent, while rates peak at approximately 0.7 percent after two years for borrowers using
subprime mortgages. These non-parametric hazard rates imply that the cumulative survival (success) rate
after 12 years for borrowers who ﬁnance their home purchase with a mortgage from a subprime lender is
approximately 87 percent, while the rate for those using a prime lender is more than 98 percent.
5.2. Competing Risks Model
In order to ease the computational burden of the maximum likelihood estimation, we were forced to
make a few assumptions. Our full data set includes all Massachusetts ownership experiences ﬁnanced by a
mortgage over the past 20 years. This accounts for approximately 1.6 million ownership experiences. After
removing observations for which any of our explanatory variables were missing, this translates into a data
set of approximately 1 million ownership experiences. We chose to truncate ownership experiences at 32
quarters (8 years), since we do not see many ownerships endure longer than 8 years in our data, and those
we do see mostly come from the early period of our dataset.35 This assumption proved to signiﬁcantly speed
up convergence in our maximum likelihood routine. To further facilitate estimation, we chose to use a 10
percent random sample of our data.36
35The estimation results are robust to changing this cutoﬀ to 48 quarters (12 years)
36In order to estimate the model, we must put the data into “long-form,” which entails expanding the data set to include
observations for each quarter that each ownership experience is active. For example, if we have an ownership experience that
began in the ﬁrst quarter of 2000 and ended in the ﬁrst quarter of 2007, we would need to create 29 quarterly observations.
Thus, our data set of 1 million ownerships becomes almost 20 million observations, and estimation becomes computationally
burdensome.
18Table 4 displays the parameter estimates. The ﬁrst column displays estimates corresponding to the
foreclosure parameters, while the second column displays estimates corresponding to the sale parameters.
The direction of the signs of the coeﬃcient estimates for foreclosure are consistent with our expectations,
and with evidence from prior studies. The estimated eﬀects of short-term interest rates (LIBOR) and the
unemployment rate on the incidence of foreclosure are positive. Borrowers who ﬁnance their house purchase
with a mortgage from a subprime lender are more likely to experience a foreclosure than those who used a
prime lender. Borrowers who purchase a condominium or a multi-family property are more likely to default
than borrowers who purchased a single-family home.
While the signs of the coeﬃcient estimates seem very reasonable, we must also verify that the magnitudes
are sensible. The quantitative implications of the parameter estimates are displayed in Table 4. The top
panel of this table displays the “standardized elasticities,” which correspond to the percentage changes in
the conditional hazard due to a one-standard deviation change in each continuous explanatory variable, and
a change from zero to one for each dichotomous explanatory variable. The bottom panel of Table 4 displays
the eﬀects of these changes on the level of the conditional default hazard for ownerships that have aged 5
years. For example, the panel shows that a homeowner who purchased with a subprime mortgage is 9 times
more likely to default, all else equal, than someone who purchased with a prime mortgage and 1.1 times
more likely to default if the unemployment rate is one standard deviation above average. Since this is a
proportional hazard model, the eﬀect of diﬀerent changes aﬀect the hazard multiplicatively, so the combined
eﬀect of subprime ownership and high unemployment is 9 × 1.1 = 9.9, not 9 + 1.1 = 10.1.
The second column in Table 4 reports the estimates for the sale hazard when we parameterize the baseline
hazard as a third-order polynomial in the length of the ownership, while the second column in Table 4 reports
the percentage changes in the conditional hazard due to a one-standard deviation change in each continuous
explanatory variable, and a change from zero to one for each dichotomous explanatory variable. Higher
initial LTV ratios are estimated to increase the probability of sale. Subprime ownerships are approximately
45 percent more likely to sell at any point in the ownership than prime ownerships. Condominiums are also
estimated to be more likely to be sold compared with single- and multi-family homes. This result is not
surprising to the extent that condominiums tend to be occupied by households that are in the early or late
stages of their life-cycle. The other notable result for sales is the signiﬁcant, negative eﬀect from an increase
in unemployment. A one-standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate is estimated to decrease the
probability of sale by approximately 12 percent.
The estimated eﬀect of cumulative house price appreciation through our proxy of housing equity on
foreclosure is, of course, at the heart of this paper. Because housing equity Eit is estimated with a linear
spline, we do not display the estimated parameters for that variable in Table 4. Rather, we graph the
predicted foreclosure and sale hazard as a function of equity in Figure 6. The other covariates have been
set to their sample averages. Overall, the ﬁgure shows that increases in Eit have a large and negative eﬀect
on foreclosures, and a large and positive eﬀect on sales, for the range of equity values between −100 and
25% of the purchase mortgage. For homeowners with equity values above 25%, further increases in equity
have a much smaller eﬀect on the foreclosure and sale hazards. This is not surprising. As discussed above,
homeowners with positive equity are unlikely to default, because they are better oﬀ selling their homes
instead. Thus, if a homeowner already has positive equity, additional positive equity is likely to matter little
in the default decision. However, when one takes into account various transactions costs involved in selling
a home, such as real estate broker commissions (often 6% of the sale price) and moving expenses, the equity
threshold at which borrowers will default may be slightly greater than zero. Thus, the apparent kink in the
predicted default hazard at 25% equity is not necessarily inconsistent with these theoretical arguments.
196. Identiﬁcation
The FOM, as well as our theoretical model, concludes that negative equity is a necessary (but not a
suﬃcient) condition for default. This ﬁnding, combined with the assumption that initial mortgage balances
are not larger than house values, means that negative house price appreciation is a necessary condition for
default. The estimation results from our empirical model conﬁrm that house price appreciation has a strong,
negative eﬀect on the probability of foreclosure. That is, a decrease in equity resulting from cumulative house
price depreciation from the time of purchase signiﬁcantly increases the probability of foreclosure for a given
ownership. One potential concern with this empirical ﬁnding is the direction of causality. The empirical
duration model assumes that the causality runs from house prices to foreclosures, and thus, that house prices
are exogenous in the model. However, if the direction of causality is the opposite, then the estimation would
suﬀer from an identiﬁcation problem, and our interpretation of the estimated parameters would be incorrect.
For example, a large concentration of foreclosures in a given neighborhood could adversely aﬀect the values
of surrounding homes in that neighborhood. It is not unreasonable to argue that this may be an issue, since
some evidence of negative, social externalities of residential foreclosure has been found in the literature.37
Another related issue is the concern that house price movements could reﬂect some other macroeconomic
inﬂuence that is the true cause of foreclosures, but which is left out of the empirical model. Perhaps the
variable that best ﬁts this description is unemployment. The intuition is that a negative unemployment
shock in a given location could directly lead to cash-ﬂow problems for households, thus causing a rise in
foreclosures. At the same time, high levels of unemployment could result in migration out of the area, which
could in turn result in a decrease in house prices. In both of these cases our causal interpretation would not
be valid. Finally, a very popular explanation of the foreclosure crisis, both in the literature, as well as in the
media, is that a relaxation of underwriting standards characterized by non-traditional mortgage products
marketed to ﬁnancially unsophisticated borrowers resulted in the foreclosure boom, which also resulted in
a house price crash.38 In this section we address these issues of identiﬁcation with a battery of robustness
checks.
We begin the discussion by making the observation that the variation over time in our equity measure
comes exclusively from variation over time in cumulative house price appreciation since the time of house
purchase for a given borrower. The variation in this variable has three sources: house price variation
over time; house price variation across geographic locations (towns/cities); and ﬁnally, variation across
homeownerships in the same town, resulting from diﬀerent purchase times. In other words, there is signiﬁcant
household-level variation in this variable across ownerships within the same town, as a result of diﬀerent
purchase times, and thus, diﬀerent housing market conditions at the time of purchase. While the time-series
variation and the variation across geographic locations in equity may both suﬀer from reverse causality or
simultaneity issues, the household-level variation does not. The intuition for this assertion is simple. If we
look at two households in the same town in the same time period, who purchased their homes ﬁve years
apart, for example, the diﬀerence in their equity positions comes from two sources: diﬀerences in initial
downpayments (i.e. initial LTV ratios, which we control for separately in the estimation), and diﬀerences in
purchase times that result in diﬀerent house-price experiences. Since both households are prone to the exact
same contemporaneous movements in house prices (recall that we measure house prices at the town level),
this source of variation does not contribute to diﬀerences in equity positions between the households (i.e. it
37See Immergluck and Smith (2006), Dubin (2008), Rogers and Winters (2008), and Leonard and Murdoch (2008) for some
examples from the literature.
38See Pavlov and Wachter (2006), Coleman IV, Lacour-Little, and Vandell (2008), Wheaton and Lee (2008), Wheaton and
Nechayev (2008) and Sanders, Chomsisengphet, Agarwal, and Ambrose (2008).
20acts like a ﬁxed eﬀect that is common to all households in the same town in the same time period).39
In fact, we ﬁnd that the majority of the variation in our equity measure (approximately 70 percent)
comes from this household component. While this should substantially mitigate any potential bias induced
by a negative eﬀect of foreclosures on house price growth, the time-series and geographic variation could still
introduce some bias in our maximum likelihood estimates. Ideally, we would like to isolate the household-
level variation in our equity measure in the estimation of its eﬀect on the probability of foreclosure. In a
linear model, this would be trivial, as we would simply specify a ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation, in which we would
include a full set of time and geographic indicator variables (and interactions). Unfortunately, this strategy
is not possible in the context of maximum likelihood estimation. First, there is a well known incidental
parameters problem, in which inconsistent estimates of the time and geographic eﬀects could also introduce
bias into the estimates of the variables of interest. Second, such a strategy would involve the inclusion
of thousands of right-hand-side variables, which coupled with the large size of the dataset, would prove
computationally infeasible.
6.1. A simple linear probability model
To test the plausibility of our identiﬁcation assumption, we explore an alternative to the non-linear,
duration framework used above, and estimate a linear probability model, in which we are able to include a
full set of time and geographic indicator variables. While a duration model is necessary to analyze many
of the questions that we pose in this paper, such as characterizing the joint distribution of conditional
foreclosure and sale probabilities, it is not necessary for estimating the relationship between equity and
foreclosure. As we explained above, this relationship is non-linear, but this can easily be captured in the
framework of a linear probability model, by specifying equity in terms of a spline or polynomial.40 Our
strategy is to estimate the linear probability model and isolate diﬀerent components of the variation in our
equity measure. If reverse causality or simultaneity is an issue, estimates of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations will
diﬀer. For example, if foreclosure has a nontrivial eﬀect on the path of house prices, then the estimate of the
relationship between equity and foreclosure using only time-series variation in house prices will be biased,
and thus diﬀerent from the unbiased estimate of the relationship when only individual-level variation in
purchase times is used. The speciﬁcation that we use is the following:
Prob(Foreclosureikt = 1|E,X) = α + βEikt + γXikt + δt + ηk + ξkt + εikt (16)
where the probability of foreclosure for individual i living in town k at time t is given by Foreclosureikt.
Equity, Eikt, is speciﬁed as a linear spline, in the same manner as it was speciﬁed in the duration model
of section 3. The vector of other controls, Xikt, is also identical to the corresponding vector included in
the duration model. Depending on the speciﬁcation, a full set of time eﬀects, δt, town eﬀects ηk, and their
respective interactions, ξkt, may be included.41
Figure 7 displays the estimation results for four diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the linear probability model.
Each panel displays predicted foreclosure probabilities as a function of equity.42 The panels also include
39Of course there is always the issue that the decision to purchase the home is endogenous, and it is possible that households
may try to time the market with their purchase. But, compared to the identiﬁcation issues discussed above, this would seem
to be of second-order importance.
40Of course one well known issue with linear probability models is the fact that predicted probabilities are not constrained
to lie in the [0, 1] interval.
41Since we are including multiple observations for each ownership in the data (speciﬁcally, one observation for each quarter
that an ownership is active), we cluster the standard errors by ownership experience.
42For the sake of brevity, we do not display all of the estimated parameters of the model. These are available upon request
from the authors.
21standard error bars, which are calculated using the Delta Method. The ﬁrst panel does not control for
time or town eﬀects; the second panel includes a set of time eﬀects; the third panel includes a set of
town eﬀects; and the fourth panel includes both time and town eﬀects (and the respective interactions).
The crucial observation to take away from the ﬁgure is the striking similarities between all of the panels.
The speciﬁcation with neither time or town eﬀects (panel 1) produced virtually identical estimates to the
speciﬁcation with a full set of time and town eﬀects (panel 4). This is substantial evidence in support of
our identiﬁcation assumption: That causality runs from house price appreciation to foreclosure, and not the
other way around. In addition, the relationship between equity and foreclosure estimated in the context of
the linear probability model is very similar to the relationship estimated in the competing-risks, duration
model in Figure 6, which to some extent validates our choice of using a linear probability model in this
section.
6.2. Further tests
In addition to estimating the linear probability models above, which we believe provides the most convinc-
ing support for our identiﬁcation assumption, we also perform further robustness checks. First, we specify
a formal Granger causality test on aggregate house price growth and foreclosure rates. Finally, we discuss a
few empirical observations that provide further support for our assumption of the direction of causality.
Our econometric test for Granger causality follows directly from the autoregressive speciﬁcation in Hamil-
ton (1994).43 We perform the estimation using quarterly data over the period 1975-2007, and include four
lags of aggregate house price appreciation, the aggregate foreclosure rate, the unemployment rate, price in-
ﬂation (CPI), wage-inﬂation, the Federal Funds Rate, and the output gap. We ﬁnd a p-value of 0.60 from the
F-test associated with the null hypothesis that foreclosures do not Granger-cause house price appreciation,
and a p-value of 0.05 from the F-test associated with the null hypothesis that house price appreciation does
not Granger-cause foreclosure rates. These results support our assumption that the direction of causality
runs from house price appreciation to foreclosures. We view the inclusion of the unemployment rate in
the Granger-causality test as especially important for validating the exogeneity assumption of cumulative
house price appreciation given our discussion about the potential simultaneity issues above. Speciﬁcally, the
inclusion of the unemployment rate in the Granger-causality test ensures that movements in house prices
are not merely reﬂections of variation in unemployment.44
Further support for our causality assumption is found in Figure 1. The ﬁgure shows that delinquencies,
deﬁned as a missed mortgage payment, are highly correlated with the Massachusetts business cycle, but that
foreclosure rates are not as correlated with the business cycle. In recessionary periods, such as the early
1990s, and the early 2000s, we see large increases in delinquency rates. However, the key point is that we
only see increases in foreclosure rates in periods of house price depreciation. For example, in the recessionary
period of 2001, delinquency rates increased signiﬁcantly, but foreclosure rates actually decreased. In contrast,
during the recessionary period of 1991, both delinquency and foreclosure rates increased signiﬁcantly. One of
the big diﬀerences between these periods is the behavior of house price appreciation. In the 2001 recessionary
period, Massachusetts house price growth was positive and increasing, while in the 1991 recessionary period,
house price growth was negative and decreasing. This makes sense, since net equity is likely positive in
periods of positive house price appreciation, and thus a household experiencing cash-ﬂow problems can
either sell their house or extract equity from their home by reﬁnancing. In periods of negative house price
growth, households suﬀering cash-ﬂow problems and with negative equity in the home will be unable to sell
43Hamilton (1994), section 11.2
44In addition, unemployment rates at the town-level are included as a control variable in the duration model.
22or reﬁnance, and will thus be forced to default. Further evidence supporting this claim can be seen in the
behavior of delinquency rates and foreclosure rates during the mid-1990s. In this period we see delinquency
rates rise, but again foreclosure rates are falling as house prices are rising. These empirical observations
are completely consistent with the theoretical prediction that negative equity is a necessary condition for
default. Thus, based upon the implications from our theoretical model and the evidence presented above,
we believe that the causality assumption in the empirical model is reasonable.
6.2.1. Measuring the Fit of the Model
To get an idea of how well the model ﬁts the foreclosure data, we use the predicted probabilities from the
model to calculate the expected number of foreclosures at each quarter of the ownership experience. The pre-
dicted probability of foreclosure for the ith ownership at quarter j can be calculated using the estimates from
the competing risk model and the expression for the foreclosure hazard. Given the predicted probabilities









where b fj is the expected number of foreclosures at age j, and nj is the number of borrowers “at-risk.” Figure
8 plots the predicted hazard rate c λj against the non-parametric, Kaplan-Meier hazard rate. The model
seems to ﬁt the data fairly well. The largest diﬀerence between the model and the data seems to be in the
last four quarters of the ownership experience, when the model over-predicts default probabilities.
Figure 9 displays this same exercise for some of the speciﬁc cohorts of ownership experiences in our data
that ranges from 1989 to 2008. While the model does not ﬁt the data perfectly, it appears to do a very
good job at getting the magnitudes and general shape of the default hazards correct.45 Borrowers who
bought their houses in 1989 and 2005 experienced the highest default hazards. This risk peaked at almost
0.7 percent after four years for the 2005 cohort, and approximately 0.5 percent after four years for the 1989
cohort. Both of these cohorts experienced signiﬁcant price declines, as Massachusetts house prices (levels)
reached a trough in 1993 and were still declining at the end of our data in December 2008.
Figure 10 displays the model’s in-sample goodness of ﬁt with respect to subprime purchase ownership
defaults. The ﬁgure displays the actual number of subprime foreclosures in each year in our sample of
subprime borrowers versus the expected number of foreclosures b fj predicted by the model of this group of
borrowers (a comparison of all ownerships is also displayed in the ﬁgure). The ﬁgure shows that the model is
not perfect, as it slightly over-predicts foreclosures from 2007–2008. However, it does a remarkably good job
of replicating the general pattern of foreclosures between 1993 and 2007, and it does predict the dramatic
rise in foreclosures beginning in 2005 that we see in the data.46
7. Counter-factual Exercise
We motivated this paper by claiming that we could address the viability of the role of bad underwriting
and falling house prices in the foreclosure crisis that emerged in Massachusetts in 2007. To do this, we use
the model estimated in Section 3 to calculate the predicted number of foreclosures under diﬀerent house
price scenarios, which gives us variation in HPA, and for diﬀerent vintages of home buyers, which yields
variation in underwriting standards. We know that vintages with bad underwriting also had bad house-price
45It is important to note that time eﬀects are not included in the estimation.
46As a robustness check, we have also estimated the model separately for the subprime purchase ownerships and ﬁnd very
similar results.
23outcomes and large numbers of foreclosures. We also know that vintages with good underwriting had good
HPA outcomes and small numbers of foreclosures. To address the motivating question of the paper, we can
look at vintages with good HPA and do the counter-factual exercise of giving them bad underwriting; if we
ﬁnd that outcomes are still extremely bad, that means that underwriting was the driver. In contrast, we
can look at vintages with good underwriting and do the counter-factual exercise of giving them bad HPA; if
we still ﬁnd good outcomes, that would be further evidence that underwriting was the drivier.
We focus on two vintages of home buyers, 2002 and 2005, because they perfectly illustrate our concept.
Subprime played almost no role in the 2002 vintage, accounting for fewer than 3 percent of the purchases in
the state, and house prices soared a cumulative X percent statewide between 2002 and 2005. And in the ﬁrst
three years of the vintage, there were almost no foreclosures; by the end of 2005 less than Y percent of the
2002 buyers had lost their homes. The contrast with 2005 could not be more marked. Subprime exploded,
accounting for 15 percent of new home purchases; and house prices peaked sometime in the summer of 2005;
by the end of 2008, they had fallen by Z percent. And after three years, Q percent of the 2005 buyers had
lost their homes to foreclosure, an order of magnitude more than the 2005 vintage.
Our ﬁrst counter-factual exercise is to take the successful 2002 vintage and give them the price experience
of the 2005 buyers. Everything else about the vintage, all the purchase characteristics including LTV and the
subprime purchase dummy as well as the dynamic variables like unemployment and interest rates remain the
same. Comparing the lines marked 2002 with 2002 prices and 2005 with 2002 prices in Figure 11 illustrates
our claim that deteriorating underwriting alone cannot explain the foreclosure crisis. Foreclosures increase
but they remain small relative to what actually happened with the 2005 vintage. This is the evidence for
our claim that bad underwriting alone could not have caused the foreclosure crisis. Because the proportional
hazard speciﬁcation is non-linear, one cannot simply interpret the gap between the counter-factual line for
2005 with 2002 prices and the 2005 line as the eﬀect of prices, a point which we return to shortly.
Our second counter-factual exercise is to take the disastrous 2005 vintage and replace the buyers with
the buyers from 2002. Again, we let the household experiences remain exactly the same except for the
prices. Foreclosures fall by roughly half, but are still enormous relative to what actually happened to the
2002 buyers – the ones who got the good prices. We interpret this as meaning that prices alone would have
resulted in a level of foreclosures that would have constituted a “crisis,” though, as we already said, not
nearly of the magnitude of the one we have experienced.47
Subprime loans do end up playing a large role in the crisis, because it is the diﬀerence between 15 percent
subprime in the 2005 vintage and 3 percent in the 2002 vintage that accounts for the diﬀerence between
the 2002 vintage with 2005 prices and the actual results for the 2005 vintage with 2005 prices. Subprime’s
contribution to the crisis, therefore, was as an accelerant but not as the root cause. Fifteen percent of buyers
in 2005 had some cocktail of problematic credit history, high payments and high LTV’s which would lead
to a high likelihood of cash-ﬂow problems. However, the logic of the lenders that made the loans was that
those borrowers could either sell or reﬁnance in that event, an outcome that became problematic when house
prices began to fall in 2005.
8. Conclusion
Using micro-data that encompasses two housing cycles in the state of Massachusetts, and a novel identi-
ﬁcation strategy, we distinguish between two competing theories of the cause of the foreclosures crisis in the
United States in 20072009. One theory holds that underwriting standards were substantially relaxed over
47In fact, one of the authors participated in a “Foreclosure Crisis” panel in March of 2006 at which time the number of
foreclosures was still a small fraction of what would obtain in 2008.
24the course of the past decade, as evidenced by the subprime mortgage boom. The subsequent expansion of
credit to lower income and minority borrowers involved the origination of a substantial number of high-cost,
onerous loans that borrowers had trouble repaying, and which led directly to the foreclosure boom, and
in turn, the signiﬁcant decline in house prices. The other theory holds that a decline in house prices that
began in late 2005 or early 2006 directly resulted in the foreclosure crisis, and that the growth in subprime
mortgage credit exacerbated the situation. Our results lend support to both explanations, but place much
more emphasis on the latter. We ﬁnd that had house prices not fallen, the foreclosure crisis would not have
occurred, regardless of whether lenders had lowered underwriting standards. By contrast, even if lenders
maintained the same underwriting standards of the early 2000s, the observed fall in house prices would have
generated a slightly smaller, but still signiﬁcant increase in foreclosures.
To arrive at these conclusions, we employ a novel strategy to identify the eﬀects of changes in house
prices on changes in foreclosure rates. Our identiﬁcation strategy involves exploiting within-town, within-
time variation in household-level measures of housing equity, which has the advantage of not suﬀering from
potential reverse causality or simultaneity issues. We employ this strategy on panel data from Massachusetts
deed records spanning the past 20 years. The data is novel and especially useful in addressing these issues
for several reasons. First, it contains the universe of all residential property and mortgage transactions
in Massachusetts, allowing us to follow borrowers for the entire length of stay in their respective homes,
regardless of the number of times they reﬁnance. Second, it contains a long time series that spans two sub-
stantial house price downturns. Finally, the data allow us to observe and match all liens on a given property,
providing us with accurate measures of the cumulative loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios that are essential for
calculating a borrowers equity position. Our estimates of a proportional hazard, competing risks model of
homeownership termination show that the relationship between equity and foreclosure is highly non-linear,
with the foreclosure hazard essentially zero for equity levels greater than 25 percent, but then rising sharply
for equity levels below 25 percent.
To motivate our empirical model, we construct a simple, two-period model of homeownership termination
that allows for a non-trivial role for household characteristics in the default decision. It does so by embedding
the traditional, option-theoretic default model in a portfolio choice framework. In the model, the household’s
ﬁnancial situation aﬀects the stochastic discount factors used to discount the costs and beneﬁts of continuing
to make mortgage payments. Through this channel, the model provides a theoretically robust argument for
the heuristic “double-trigger” model of default that is often referenced (and assumed) in the literature, but
which to our knowledge has not yet been formally derived. This model posits that foreclosure occurs when
a borrower faces negative equity and cash-ﬂow problems, but a crucial point that diﬀerentiates our model
from others in the literature is that it does not distinguish between “strategic” and “non-strategic” default.
In the model, borrowers have access to unsecured credit, implying that a mortgage payment is never, strictly
speaking, unaﬀordable. In such an environment, a borrower in ﬁnancial distress with negative equity will
choose not to default as long as they believe that house prices will rise rapidly in the future. But, it is also
possible in the model that a borrower in good ﬁnancial health may default if he or she believes that house
prices are going to continue to fall.
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27Appendix
A. Proof of proposition
Proof:
We start the proof by dividing the problem into two optimization problems, one in which the borrower
always keeps the house (K) and one in which the borrower always defaults (D). Let cK(w) and cD(w)
be the constant level of consumption which yields the same utility as the optimal consumption proﬁle for
keepers and defaulters respectively. We now characterize the critical value of wealth, w∗ such that w > w∗
⇔ cK(w) > cD(w). Let wi
L be the value of wealth such that if w > wi
L the consumer saves, and if w < wi
B
the consumer borrows. It follows that for each problem the two critical values wi
L > wi
B, where i = K,D,
have the following properties:
w > wi
L ⇒ θL > 0,θB = 0 (18)
wi
L ≥ w ≥ wi
B ⇒ θL = θB = 0 (19)
w < wi
B ⇒ θL = 0,θB > 0, (20)
where θL is dollars saved and θB is dollars borrowed. Since we assume that it is more expensive to own
the house than to rent the house, keepers have less current consumption than defaulters. Thus, under (7),
keepers’ marginal utility of consumption is high relative to that of defaulters. Keepers therefore wish to






To solve the general problem, we start with w > wK
L which by equations (18) and (21) implies that
θL > 0 for both keepers and defaulters. Since both consumers are at interior solutions, the permanent
income hypothesis holds and consumption is proportional to lifetime income, Y , which is
Yi =
(





RL − rMM, i = K
y0 + w +
y1
RL − ρ, i = D







> rMM − ρ (23)
(H − M)+
RL
− rMM > −ρ (24)
Thus, when w > wK
L , cK(w) exceeds cD(w). Similar logic shows that when w < wD
B, cD(w) exceeds
cK(w).
To prove our basic claim, we simply need to show that the slope of cK(w) always exceeds the slope of
cD(w) which implies that the two lines cross at a single point. To do this, deﬁne the “shadow riskless rate”
as:













We now show that the shadow riskless rate for keepers exceeds the shadow riskless rate for defaulters in the
range [wK
L ,wD
B]. We look at three regions within this range.
We start with the region wK
L ≥ w ≥ wD
L , in which the keeper does not save but the defaulter does,
so the shadow riskless rate for the keeper must exceed RL, otherwise θL > 0. Thus, in this ﬁrst region
(1 + rK) > RL = (1 + rD) which implies that ∂cK
∂w > ∂cD
∂w .
In the second region, wD
L ≥ w ≥ wK
B, θB = θL = 0 and neither type saves. When both keepers and




y1 + (H − M)+
y0 + w − rMM





y0 + w − ρ
for i = D.
Since we assume that rMM > ρ and (H − M)+ > 0, equation 25 gives us the inequality:
1 + rK =
y1 + (H − M)+
y0 + w − rMM
>
y1
y0 + w − ρ
= 1 + rD
Which from (26) implies ∂cK
∂w > ∂cD
∂w .
In the region wK
B ≥ w ≥ wD
B, in which the defaulter holds no assets but the keepers borrows so the
shadow riskless rate for the defaulter must fall short of RB, otherwise θB > 0. Increases in rM, and M−1 and
decreases in H shift the cK curve up without aﬀecting the cD curve, leading to increases in w∗. Increases in
ρ shift the cD curve down reducing w∗. To show the remaining results requires a straightforward application
of the Implicit Function Theorem￿
B. Construction of Weighted, Repeat-Sale House Price Indexes
We follow Case and Shiller (1987) and Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) in constructing our house
price indexes. The index for each town is based on the assumption that the house price of household i at
time t is given by the following process:
lnPit = ln ¯ Pt +  it + ηit, (27)
where ¯ Pt is the house price level of the town, ηit is white noise, and  it is a Gaussian random walk with




The index is calculated using a three-stage process on paired sales of one-family houses. High frequency
sales—occurring six months or less apart—were dropped. Sales with appreciation greater than 50 percent
within one year, greater than 100 percent within 1.5 years, and 150 percent within two years were dropped
due to the high probability of renovation. Sales with depreciation larger than 25 percent within one year
and 50 percent within two years were dropped because of the high probability of a subdivision or heavy
deterioration reducing the property’s previous value. House prices less then $15,000 and greater than $10
million were dropped.
29House price indexes were developed for every Massachusetts city with more than 5,000 sale observations
between January 1987 and August 2007. All other towns were excluded from the sample. In the ﬁrst stage,





βtDt + ωi, (28)
where ˙ pi = lnP 2nd
i,t+k − lnP 1st
i,t , and the dummy variables have the value +1 for the time of the second sale,
and the value -1 for the time of the ﬁrst sale.
In the second stage, the squared residuals, ω2
i, are regressed on k and k2:
ω2
i = A + Bk + Ck2. (29)
In the third stage, equation 28 is estimated by GLS, using ˆ ωi—the square roots of the predicted values
of equation 29—as weights.
The house price index is then constructed from the estimates βt:
P Index
t = 100 ∗ exp(βt). (30)
In the ﬁgure below, we plot P Index
t for the entire state of Massachusetts, as well as four cities—Boston,
Springﬁeld, Lowell, and Newton—which are indicative of the state’s various geographic regions, as well as
diﬀerent ethnic and income pools.
30C. Robustness Check for Subprime Lender Indicator
This appendix provides a detailed robustness check of our subprime purchase indicator variable. As we
discussed above, this variable is based on HUD’s annual list of lenders who originate predominantly subprime
loans. This list is certainly an imperfect proxy for the subprime market, as the mortgage lenders on the
HUD list do not do business in the subprime market exclusively. Moreover, there are lenders who are not on
the HUD list, but who do provide loans to subprime borrowers. Therefore, by using the HUD subprime list,
we are introducing two potential mistakes into our analysis. First, we are falsely labeling some mortgages
as subprime that were really made to prime borrowers, a misidentiﬁcation that we call “false positives.”
Second, we are falsely labeling some mortgages as prime that are really issued to subprime borrowers, a
misidentiﬁcation that we call “false negatives.” If our results are to be taken seriously, it is important to
estimate the magnitude of both of these identiﬁcation errors.
Fortunately, we have a limited amount of information regarding mortgage interest rates in the Warren
Group data that makes it possible to check the magnitude of these errors. We have detailed interest rate
information on approximately 5 percent of mortgages originated between 2004 and 2006. This includes
the initial interest rate, the date when the interest rate is ﬁrst allowed to change (often referred to as the
“hybrid” term), the index that the rate is tied to once it is allowed to ﬂuctuate, and the diﬀerence between
the mortgage rate and this index. This diﬀerence is commonly referred to as the “margin.” However, this
information is available only for adjustable-rate mortgages.48
With these variables we construct our own deﬁnition of a “high-cost” mortgage and use this to calculate
subprime mortgage indicators to compare with the indicators taken from the HUD list. First, we took all of
the adjustable-rate mortgages with initial interest rate information, and divided these into two categories:
those with initial ﬁxed-rate terms (hybrid terms) less than three years inclusive, and those with initial ﬁxed-
rate terms over three years. Then, we took the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), prime,
1-year adjustable interest rate series, and subtracted it from the initial interest rates for mortgages with
initial ﬁxed-rate terms less than three years. Similarly, we took the Freddie Mac, prime, 5-year adjustable
interest rate series and subtracted it from the initial interest rates for mortgages with initial ﬁxed-rate terms
over three years. We labeled as subprime all mortgages for which this diﬀerence was greater than 200 basis
points, or for which the margin was greater than 350 basis points. This method is a somewhat arbitrary way
to deﬁne a subprime mortgage; however, the term “subprime” itself is somewhat arbitrary, and a universal
deﬁnition of a subprime mortgage does not currently exist. Some analysts use a secondary market deﬁnition
and deﬁne a subprime mortgage to mean a loan that is part of a pool of securitized mortgages that has been
labeled “subprime.” However, in many cases subprime mortgage pools also contain a non-negligible number
of mortgages held by borrowers that many analysts would consider to be credit-worthy prime borrowers.49
Other analysts, including those who work with HMDA data, deﬁne a subprime mortgage as we do, based on
the spread between the contracted interest rate and a market index; however, there is no general consensus
on the magnitude of the spread. We believe that our subprime deﬁnition is conservative, as a 200 basis point
spread between the initial interest rate and the corresponding FHLMC prime series is large, and a 350 basis
point margin is also quite large. For example, a two-year hybrid, adjustable-rate mortgage originated in July
2007, with an initial interest rate of 8 percent, and a margin of 350 basis points with respect to the 6-month
48The information is taken directly from the mortgage documents in the Registries of Deeds. Adjustable-rate mortgage
documents contain “riders” that state all of the information necessary for a borrower to calculate her interest at each stage
of the mortgage. Fixed-rate mortgage documents do not contain any interest rate information. Interest rate information for
ﬁxed-rate mortgages is located in the mortgage note, which is not publicly available.
49For example, we found using data from LoanPerformance Inc. for Middlesex County, MA, that 20 percent of mortgages
in subprime pools are made to borrowers with FICO scores above 700.
31LIBOR, which would translate into an interest rate of approximately 9 percent (assuming that interest rates
remain constant over the next two years), would barely qualify as a subprime mortgage using our deﬁnition.
The table below displays a cross-tabulation of the subprime variable constructed with the HUD list,
versus the subprime variable constructed using the interest rate information. The most important statistics
for our purposes are the two that are highlighted in bold font. The interpretation is that 7.85 percent of
mortgages from a subprime lender on the HUD list are considered to be prime by our deﬁnition, using the
spread between the contract rate and the appropriate FHLMC series. Similarly, 26.04 percent of mortgages
from a non-subprime lender on the HUD list are considered to be subprime.
HUD subprime indicator
prime subprime Total
prime 43,485 1,361 44,846
(< 200 basis point diﬀerence) 96.97% 3.03%
73.96% 7.85%
subprime 15,308 15,981 31,289
(≥ 200 basis point diﬀerence) 48.92% 51.08%
26.04% 92.15%
Total 58,793 17,342
With these two statistics we can develop a simple model to estimate the eﬀect of these errors on foreclosure
rates. If we let D∗
sub be the observed foreclosure rate for subprime ownerships, D∗
prime the observed rate for
prime ownerships, and Dsub and Dprime the respective true rates, we can write the observed rates as linear
functions of the true rates and the errors:
D∗
sub = Dsub ∗ (1 − α) + Dprime ∗ α (31)
and
D∗
prime = Dsub ∗ (1 − β) + Dprime ∗ β. (32)
In equation 31, α is the fraction of mortgages identiﬁed as subprime from the HUD list that are really prime,
and β is the fraction of mortgages identiﬁed from the HUD list as prime that are really subprime. Since
we have estimates of both α and β from the table above, the system of equations 31 and 32 contains two
unknowns (the true, unbiased foreclosure rates), and thus it is easy to solve. If we assume a spread of 200
basis points and 350 basis points as our subprime deﬁnition criteria, our result that approximately 18 percent
of subprime ownership experiences end in default after 12 years, then changes to approximately 19.5 percent
of subprime ownerships ending in default. It is important to note that the unbiased foreclosure rates are
sensitive to our estimates of α and β, which in turn are a function of the spread between the contracted
mortgage rate and the rate upon which we based our subprime deﬁnition. Furthermore, the key assumption
on which the above relationship depends is that the sample of subprime mortgages that we capture with the
HUD list and the entire population of subprime mortgages are not systematically diﬀerent.
32Table 1: Some facts about the Massachusetts housing market, 1988-2008
Purchase Initial Loan-to-Value Ratios
Fore-
closures Sales
All ownerships Ownerships that Default
# mean median # mean median
1988 68,982 0.76 0.80 5,761 0.83 0.80
1989 57,309 0.77 0.80 4,412 0.85 0.88
1990 1,730 60,878 46,407 0.79 0.80 2,551 0.88 0.90
1991 5,638 62,147 47,890 0.80 0.80 1,279 0.90 0.95
1992 9,236 73,532 56,398 0.80 0.80 955 0.91 0.95
1993 8,119 81,305 62,545 0.82 0.85 965 0.92 0.95
1994 7,049 88,603 68,668 0.82 0.87 1,015 0.92 0.95
1995 4,662 82,444 63,687 0.83 0.87 936 0.94 0.97
1996 4,202 92,240 72,493 0.83 0.87 945 0.94 0.97
1997 3,825 98,514 77,759 0.83 0.85 959 0.93 0.97
1998 2,764 109,294 88,004 0.83 0.85 859 0.92 0.95
1999 2,030 110,484 88,950 0.82 0.85 974 0.92 0.95
2000 1,461 103,414 83,452 0.81 0.82 1,007 0.91 0.95
2001 1,078 99,803 81,638 0.82 0.85 977 0.92 0.95
2002 952 107,010 87,281 0.81 0.82 1,172 0.92 0.95
2003 587 109,866 89,432 0.82 0.85 1,564 0.92 0.95
2004 643 121,337 98,057 0.82 0.87 2,765 0.93 0.98
2005 914 115,816 95,505 0.83 0.90 3,641 0.95 1.00
2006 2,805 96,985 81,016 0.84 0.90 2,598 0.96 1.00
2007 7,142 82,922 68,764 0.84 0.90 349 0.95 1.00
2008 9,362 50,036 39,776 0.82 0.85 3 0.83 0.97
Sale and foreclosure numbers come from data compiled by The Warren Group, and reﬂect only residential properties.
Data from 2008 are available through September. Each year corresponds to a speciﬁc ownership cohort. Loan-to-
value ratios are cumulative in the sense that they include all mortgages obtained at the time of purchase, including
second and third mortgages where applicable.
Table 2: Subprime Lenders in Massachusetts
# loans % of subprime status
purchase mortgages
Option One Mortgage Corp. 11,204 18.7 shut down
New Century Financial Corp. 5,973 10.0 shut down
Freemont Investment & Loan 5,567 9.3 shut down
Argent Mortgage Company 3,602 6.0 shut down
Summit Mortgage Company 3,282 5.5 shut down
Mortgage Lender Net 2,825 4.7 shut down
Long Beach Mortgage Corp. 2,504 4.2 shut down
WMC Mortgage Corp. 2,307 3.9 shut down
Accredited Home Lenders 2,174 3.6 shut down
First Franklin Financial 1,871 3.1 shut down
Total 41,309 69.0 -
Note: This is a list of the top ten subprime lenders in terms of number of purchase mortgage originations in Mas-
sachusetts from 1993 to 2008. The status of each lender is updated through January 2009.
33Table 3: Subprime Foreclosure Statistics in Massachusetts
Subprime Foreclosures from ownerships with
Ownerships subprime last mortgage at least one
Started purchase subprime subprime
1993 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1994 0.37% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1995 0.42% 0.00% 0.15% 0.17%
1996 0.89% 0.05% 0.52% 0.67%
1997 1.91% 0.16% 1.59% 1.83%
1998 2.58% 0.90% 4.16% 4.78%
1999 2.46% 3.35% 8.92% 11.18%
2000 2.47% 4.38% 12.53% 15.81%
2001 2.90% 4.73% 14.10% 19.67%
2002 3.92% 7.35% 17.86% 24.47%
2003 6.91% 9.71% 22.83% 29.47%
2004 10.06% 10.89% 26.28% 35.46%
2005 14.81% 17.83% 37.53% 47.92%
2006 13.04% 28.31% 44.99% 58.68%
2007 3.12% 30.52% 43.00% 57.39%
2008 0.00% 30.21% 39.29% 55.61%
Note: Subprime foreclosure numbers are calculated as percentages of the total number of foreclosures in a given year.
34Table 4: Estimation Results
(1) Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
initial CLTV (fraction) 0.82 0.17 0.1 1.25
subprime purchase indicator 0.04 0.19 0 1
condo indicator 0.22 0.41 0 1
multi-family indicator 0.1 0.31 0 1
equity (% of original mortgage balance) 0.74 0.95 -0.78 23.2
LIBOR(6-month) 4.33 1.85 1.17 10.02
cumulative unemployment change (town-level) 0.06 0.5 -1 5
median family income (2000 zip code-level) 56517 18877 15648 153918
% of minority households (2000 zip code) 15.1 16.22 0 98.72
(2) Coeﬃcient Estimates
Default Sale
Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err.
initial CLTV 0.17 0.19 1.50 0.04
LIBOR -0.03 0.01 -0.06 2.88e-03
cumulative unemployment 0.023 0.04 -0.08 9.83e-03
median income (2000 zip code) -2.23e-05 1.54e-06 1.59e-06 2.63e-07
% minority (2000 zip code) 5.35e-03 9.19e-04 1.33e-03 3.06e-04
subprime purchase indicator 1.82 0.04 0.34 0.02
condo indicator 0.10 0.05 0.57 0.01
multi-family property indicator 0.52 0.04 6.26e-03 0.02
# unique borrowers 194,374 194,374
Log Likelihood -310,158 -310,158




(+/-) std. dev. % change hazard % change hazard
initial ltv (fraction) 0.17 1.03 1.29
LIBOR – 6-month (percentage points) 1.85 0.94 0.90
cumulative unemployment change (fraction) 0.5 1.12 0.96
% minority (2000 zip code) 19.58 1.09 1.02
median income (2000 zip code) $24,493 0.66 1.03
multi-family indicator . 1.68 1.01
condo indicator . 1.11 1.01
subprime purchase indicator . 6.18 1.40
Note: Continuous explanatory variables are increased/decreased by one standard
deviation while dichotomous explanatory variables are changed from zero to one.















































36Figure 2: Example of the Ownership Experiences Associated with a Single Property
Notes: This example considers a property in which we see two sale transactions (red lines) and ﬁve mortgage transactions (blue lines). In this case we are able to
identify three separate ownership experiences associated with this property. The ﬁrst ownership experience comprises all transactions between the beginning of
our data and the ﬁrst sale of the property (1 mortgage). The second ownership experience includes all the transactions between the ﬁrst and second sale of the
property (3 mortgages), and ﬁnally, the third ownership experience includes all transactions between the second sale and the end of our data set (1 mortgage).
The example in the ﬁgure illustrates that censoring is an issue with our data. In this particular example, the ﬁrst ownership experience is left-censored, since we
do not see the start of the experience, while the third ownership experience is right-censored, since we do not see the end of the experience. We address how we
treat censored observations in our discussion of the estimation method in section 3.
3
7Figure 3: Comparison of Massachusetts and the rest of the country. Source: MBA National Delinquency
Survey.
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41Figure 7: Estimated Eﬀect of Equity on Foreclosure: Results from a Linear Probability Model

































































































2Figure 8: Predicted Hazard Rate versus Kaplan-Meier Hazard Rate (1987-2008)

































43Figure 9: Predicted versus Actual Default Hazard Rates
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